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DEDICATION
HON. ELLSWORTH A. VAN GRAAFEILAND
Charles K. Whiteheadt
If I could ask him, I have no doubt that the late Judge Van
Graafeiland would tell me I could find something more useful to do
than write his dedication. A tough questioner on the bench and a
fierce dissenter, the Judge was a modest, unassuming person in cham-
bers-a mentor, a role model, and a teacher to his many law clerks,
one of whom I was fortunate to be. The Judge received his L.L.B. at
Cornell Law School in 1940, and I am reminded of him each morning
I arrive at Myron Taylor Hall.
President Ford appointed Judge Van Graafeiland to the Second
Circuit in 1974. No stranger to the federal courts, the Judge was an
experienced litigator and senior partner of one of the premier law
firms in Rochester, New York, his hometown. He took senior status
upon reaching seventy, but stayed on the bench until November 2004,
when he died at eighty-nine.
The Judge's opinions were succinct, with asides kept to a mini-
mum (the Judge would approve of my limited use of footnotes). To
do justice to them, penned over thirty years, would transform this ded-
ication into a casebook. I have selected a few of his opinions that, I
hope, give a sense of the breadth and magnitude of the impact he
had.
Let me briefly set the stage. The Judge ascended to the bench in
the wake of controversy surrounding the judicial activism of the 1960s
and 1970s, often in politically charged areas such as civil rights, voting
rights, and the environment. At the core of the controversy, the de-
bate turned on different conceptions of the judiciary's role in the
American constitutional order. Some counseled self-restraint, per-
ceiving distinct limits around properjudicial authority; others took an
expansive view, urging the courts to assume a more activist role in
protecting individual rights.
The Judge was clear in how he saw his job and the role of the
courts: not to favor a view of what the law "should" be, however close
that view was to his personal beliefs, but rather to identify the relevant
legal principles and apply them to the case before him. The Judge
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I appreciate the thoughtful comments pro-
vided by Gary Van Graafeiland, as well as by many of the Judge's law clerks, including Marc
Packer and Susan Palmer.
always read the record meticulously.1 When considering a case, he
saw the people affected by its outcome-their fears and hopes, the
particular interests at stake, and the problems that had brought them
to court. His opinions spoke directly to them and to the matters be-
ing contested.
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
One of the Judge's early opinions, in a rare en banc decision in
which he and three others dissented from a five-judge majority, cap-
tured the Judge's sense of the judiciary's function. The plaintiff in
Turpin v. Mailet alleged he was arrested by two West Haven, Connecti-
cut, police officers in retaliation for filing a lawsuit arising from a
third officer's use of excessive force. 2 Turpin sued the arresting of-
ficers for money damages under state and federal law, including 42
U.S.C. § 1983. He also sued West Haven directly under the Four-
teenth Amendment, because municipalities were not liable under
§ 1983.3
In the lower court, Judge Newman, then a district court judge,
concluded that a right of action could not be implied directly from
the Fourteenth Amendment. The en banc majority reversed, holding
the court to have the power to fashion a "common law" remedy for
constitutional violations. 4 It reasoned that, in so doing, it was "doing
no more than creating structures for enforcement similar to those
normally fashioned by legislatures," "open[ing] a dialogue with Con-
gress," and "invigorat[ing] the political process [so that Congress
could] use the court's determination as a focal point for the re-exami-
nation of the policy questions involved."
5
The Judge, in dissent, did not contest the need for redress, but
focused instead on who should craft the remedy. By its nature, the
Judge wrote, the majority's decision was much more than a "dialogue"
with Congress. If the decision was legislative in nature, Congress
could kiter choose to "reverse" it. If, however, it interpreted constitu-
tional guarantees, Congress had no authority to enact laws inconsis-
tent with what the court decided. Identifying which part of the
decision fell into what category would be tricky; moreover, the Judge
argued, not knowing how to separate them, Congress was more likely
to defer, rather than react, to the outcome.
6
1 SeeJoseph M. McLaughlin, The Second Circuit-Year in Revue, 61 BRoor. L. REv. 347,
354 (1995) ("No one reads a record as carefully as Judge Van Graafeiland.").
2 See 579 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom.
City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978), modified, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 157,
5 Id. at 157-58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 Id. at 174 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
The Judge therefore cautioned restraint. In his view, the ques-
tion was "one of representative democratic government versus judicial
autocracy," specifically "whether the American people, speaking
through their Congress and their written Constitution, [had] author-
ized [the court] to permit an award of damages against municipalities
directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. '7 In the Judge's view, the
answer was no-Congress had already addressed the question by
choosing not to include municipalities within § 1983.8 Congress, he
reasoned, could amend § 1983 if it chose to include municipalities.
In the meantime, the judiciary should remain clear of the legislative
process, "expound[ing] the law as it should come before them, free
from the bias of having participated in its formation."9 The Judge
challenged the majority to address the full impact of the decision.
What would be its economic and social effects? Could any violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment give rise to civil liability? What immuni-
ties or defenses would apply?10 Those questions were a natural conse-
quence of the majority's decision, but remaining unanswered, they
underscored for the Judge that " [i] f intervention [in community gov-
ernment] is to come from the federal government, it should come
from Congress, not the courts."11
REVERSE DISCRIMINATION AND QUOTAS
Federal courts have long wrestled with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's requirement that states not deprive inhabitants of "equal pro-
tection of the laws." 12 For claims based on race, the issue has often
turned on whether equal protection requires the race-neutral treat-
ment of all individuals or whether it guarantees a minimum outcome
for minority groups. The Judge was among the first federal jurists to
challenge the constitutionality of racially based quotas. At its heart
was a conception of American democracy committed to individuals
over groups, requiring protection against all forms of racial classifica-
tion. That view was encapsulated in several opinions the Judge wrote
for the court in the 1970s.
In Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, the
Second Circuit addressed a class action contesting the constitutional-
ity of a New York civil service examination. 13 Writing for the court,
the Judge upheld the district court's finding that the test was unconsti-
tutional, as well as the district court's order to develop a new, nondis-
7 Id. at 173-74.
8 Id. at 177.
9 Id. at 173 (quoting Rufus King, a Constitutional delegate).
10 Id. at 179-84.
11 Id. at 184.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
13 See 520 F.2d 420, 427 (2d Cir. 1975).
criminatory selection process. 14 He was troubled, however, by the
imposition of employment quotas. 15 A quota, he thought, might be
justified in response to a clear-cut pattern of racial discrimination.
16
In this case, data regarding prior examinations were incomplete, and
there was limited evidence of racial imbalance among employees.
1 7
Moreover, the Judge noted, any quota would negatively affect "a small
number of readily identifiable candidates" who would know in ad-
vance that they "may be bypassed for advancement solely because they
are white. 1 8 The outcome, the Judge predicted, would be an escala-
tion of racial tension. Like his Turpin dissent, the Judge cautioned the
judiciary to "act with great reluctance" in interfering with local gov-
ernment. 19 Absent racial discrimination, "if a decision is to be made
to subordinate the social purposes of civil service to those of equal
employment opportunity, that decision should be made by the people
speaking through their legislators.."
20
A subsequent case, Chance v. Board of Examiners, involved a New
York school board policy known as "excessing," in which the least se-
nior supervisor was transferred, demoted, or terminated if a supervi-
sory position was eliminated. 2' The excessing plan was neutral on its
face, operating in all cases on a "last-in, first-out" basis. It was chal-
lenged, however, for its disproportionate effect on African-American
and Puerto Rican supervisors, many of whom were less senior. Writ-
ing for the majority, the Judge struck down the district court's imposi-
tion of racial quotas as "constitutionally forbidden reverse
discrimination." 22 A key to the decision was what the quota was not.
It was not remedial, it was not designed to benefit supervisors harmed
by prior discrimination, and it was not put in place to protect against
future discrimination. 23 The court concluded that its one goal-to
ensure a minimum number of minority supervisors-was constitution-
ally barred. 24 Moreover, like in Kirkland, a quota would have had a
particularly harsh effect on a small, identifiable group. Some districts
had only two or three employees, meaning that a quota would "re-
quire a senior, experienced white member of such a group to stand
14 Id. at 425-27.
15 Id. at 429.
16 Id. at 427.
17 Id. at 428.
18 Id. at 429.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See 534 F.2d 993, 995 (2d Cir. 1976).
22 Id. at 998-99.
23 Id. at 998. To the extent supervisors had been denied seniority based on prior
discrimination, the court ordered that they should be placed in the same position they
would have had if they were not the target of discrimination. Id. at 999.
24 Id.
aside and forego the seniority benefits guaranteed him by [New York
law] and his union contract, solely because a younger, less exper-
ienced member" was African-American or Puerto Rican.2 5 Having re-
versed the district court's order, the Judge again counseled in favor of
federal-court restraint. "We note that the New York Court of Appeals
has specifically held that the Board of Education has the power to
establish uniform City-wide excessing rules," he wrote. 26 "Should the
question of excessing authority vis-a-vis the community districts and
the Board of Education again arise in this proceeding, we trust that
the District Court will defer to the New York State courts' primary
concern and expertise in this matter, in so far as it is feasible to do
SO."27
THE AGENT ORANGE LITIGATION
The Agent Orange litigation involved members of the United
States, Australian, and New Zealand armed forces and their families
who sued the United States and several major chemical companies for
injuries allegedly arising from exposure to Agent Orange, an herbi-
cide sprayed during the Vietnam War.28 The litigation received na-
tionwide attention, in part as "a method of public protest at perceived
national indifference to Vietnam veterans."29
It was a landmark case, heralding a coming wave of mass-tort liti-
gation. A substantial portion of the Judge's chambers was taken up by
Agent Orange materials. By its conclusion, the trial court's docket
sheet was reported to contain 375 single-spaced pages and roughly
6000 individual entries; an entire room, staffed by two clerks, was
needed to house the paperwork. 30 I began my clerkship as the Judge
was finalizing his opinions. The court issued nine opinions, and the
Judge authored four of them (I assisted on one).
The Judge was tasked with addressing various claims against the
United States brought by the veterans, their families, and the defen-
dant chemical companies. The court affirmed their dismissal, princi-
pally relying on the Feres doctrine, an exception to the waiver of
sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
service members that arose during or incidental to their service. 31 As
the Judge noted in dismissing the claims, the Feres doctrine cautioned
25 Id. at 998.
26 Id. at 999.
27 Id.
28 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1987).
29 Id.
30 See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 342 (1986).
31 See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977); Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
restraint when the court was asked to pass, as in this case, on the Presi-
dent's and Congress's discretionary military decisions. "Absent a sub-
stantial constitutional issue, the wisdom of the decisions made by
these concurrent branches of the Government should not be subject
to judicial review."
3 2
The Feres doctrine barred the bulk of the veterans' claims against
the United States, and there was little evidence to support their sepa-
rate lawsuit against the chemical companies. 33 Why, then, had they
pursued this litigation? The court was concerned that the prospect of
lucrative legal fees had been a driving force, perhaps to the veterans'
disadvantage. In the lower court, Chief Judge Weinstein had ap-
proved a class-action settlement before learning, four months later, of
a fee-sharing agreement among the lead lawyers, awarding some of
them a substantial windfall. 34 The incentive to settle the litigation
early, even if not in the class's best interests, was apparent. Under the
agreement, as soon as a threshold amount was reached, the lead law-
yers' returns diminished. 35 In this instance, in light of the weakness of
their case, the settlement was likely the best the veterans could do.
Anticipating future complex suits, however, the court set aside the fee-
sharing agreement (and denied a request for higher legal fees).
Judge Miner wrote the court's opinions in this area, but they reso-
nated with Judge Van Graafeiland's long-time experience as a trial
lawyer.
INSIDER TRADING
The Judge authored some of the nation's most forward-looking
decisions in cases involving financial fraud. Among them was United
States v. Newman,36 decided shortly after the Supreme Court handed
down Chiarella v. United States. 7 Chiarella involved insider trading by
the employee of a New York-based financial printer who, having iden-
tified the targets of prospective tender offers, bought shares in ad-
vance of the bid's announcement. 38 The Supreme Court found that
those in possession of material nonpublic information had a duty to
disclose that information or abstain from trading, or else risk penalty
under Rule lOb-5. Disclose-or-abstain, however, was not triggered
merely by the possession of inside information. Rather, according to
the Court, the obligation arose when the possessor of inside informa-
tion had a fiduciary duty to the person with whom he traded, prompt-
32 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1987).
3 Id. at 149-51.
34 Id. at 218-19.
35 Id. at 224.
36 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
37 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
38 Id. at 224.
ing an affirmative duty to speak.39 Since Chiarella traded with people
to whom he did not owe a fiduciary duty, the Supreme Court held he
had no liability under Rule lOb-5.
In dissent, ChiefJustice Berger argued that how a trader acquired
inside information should bear on liability. Traders should be liable
"when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experi-
ence, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means." 40 Accord-
ingly, "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has
an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trad-
ing," leaving open a misappropriation theory-based on a duty to dis-
close to the market-as an alternative basis of Rule lOb-5 liability. 41
The facts in Newman were similar to those in Chiarella. Employees
of two investment banks had misappropriated confidential informa-
tion concerning takeovers by the firms' clients. Like in Chiarella, the
Newman defendants worked on behalf of the acquirers, but used the
information to buy target stocks. They owed no fiduciary duties to the
investors with whom they traded. The district court, relying on
Chiarella, dismissed the Rule lOb-5 indictments. The Second Circuit
reversed, adopting a misappropriation theory, but one that was mark-
edly different from the approach taken in the Chiarella dissent.
Rather than a duty to the market, the Judge concluded that the de-
fendants' misappropriation had breached a duty to their employers
and clients. 42 He reasoned that Rule lOb-5, by its terms, outlaws any
fraud or deceit "in connection with" a securities transaction, not lim-
ited to defrauding purchasers or sellers.43 In this case, the defendants
had stolen valuable information from their employers, sullying their
reputation and defrauding them "as surely as if they took their
money. '44 That was enough to impose insider-trading liability.45
Sixteen years later, the Newman analysis was confirmed by the Su-
preme Court in United States v. O'Hagan.46 The Court endorsed the
misappropriation theory, but effectively adopted the Second Circuit
standard rather than the Chiarella dissent. The focus in O'Hagan was
on a fiduciary's use of a principal's information for personal gain with-
out disclosing that use to the principal. Citing Newman, the Court
concluded that a misappropriator's liability was premised on his de-
39 Id. at 230-35.
40 Id. at 240 (Berger, C.J., dissenting).
41 Id.
42 Newman v. United States, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
43 Id. at 17-18.
44 id. at 17.
45 Id. at 19.
46 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
ceiving the source of the information, not on a duty running to the
investors with whom he traded.4
7
Judge Van Graafeiland believed that judicial independence im-
poses an obligation to resolve cases according to strict legal principles.
Among them was a requirement to accord proper deference to other
branches of government-but also to assess those branches' actions
against the necessary legal and constitutional yardsticks. Striking a
balance could be difficult. In a legacy of opinions spanning the spec-
trum of human interaction, the Judge was persistent in his focus on
applying the law to the case at hand, treating each case as a case and
not as a platform on which to build new principles of law. Doing so
demanded a willingness to decide the issues on the specific facts, not
on a preconceived philosophy. That approach, perhaps, best re-
flected the Judge's vision of American democracy-a focus on individ-
ual liberties guaranteed by the Constitution but principally exercised
through elective government.
Following my clerkship, I had a number of opportunities to visit
the Judge in Rochester and New York City. I have missed the Judge's
love of the law and his work. Over the years, it set a standard for me,
as well as for other law clerks and lawyers, that guided our careers.
Above all else, the Judge truly enjoyed being ajudge. Sometimes that
enjoyment became apparent in his opinions. In Hormel Foods Corp. v.
Jim Henson Productions Inc.,48 for example, the Judge addressed a re-
quest by Hormel, the maker of SPAM, for a permanent injunction
against Jim Henson Productions for its intended use of a character
named "Spa'am" on merchandise related to its film, Muppet Treasure
Island. In the movie, Spa'am was the high priest of a tribe of wild
boars that worshipped Miss Piggy. Henson, thought the Judge, had
"hope[d] to poke a little fun at Hormel's famous luncheon meat by
associating its processed, gelatinous block with a humorously wild
beast."49 Hormel, however, worried that sales of SPAM would drop off
if it was linked with "evil in porcine form. ' 50 Noting that "Hormel
should be inured to any such ridicule," the Judge described a few of
the "countless jokes" that played off unfounded suspicions over
SPAM's ingredients.51 Finding those jokes to be fairly common, the
Judge wryly noted, "[0]ne might think Hormel would welcome the
47 Id. at 651.
48 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
49 Id. at 501.
50 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
51 Id.
association [of SPAM] with a genuine source of pork," before af-
firming the district court's denial.
52
This dedication is a small tribute to one of Cornell Law School's
preeminent graduates. The true dedication can be found in the
countless lives Judge Van Graafeiland touched and the opinions he
wrote. That legacy will continue. My hope, in a small way, is to impart
to my students the same spark and love of lawyering that the Judge
passed on to me.
52 Id. at 501, 508.

